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ADAR V. SMITH : PENALIZING INNOCENT
CHILDREN FOR THE “SINS” OF THE PARENTS
By: Ruth Hackford-Peer1

In 2007, the Tenth Circuit held as
unconstitutional, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the Oklahoma adoption statute that refused to recognize
or issue a birth certificate to a child adopted by a samesex couple. In 2011, on similar facts, the Fifth Circuit
upheld Louisiana’s refusal to reissue a birth certificate to
a child who was born in Louisiana but adopted by a
gay male couple in New York. This recent circuit split
highlights constitutional issues regarding the treatment
of adopted children of gay and lesbian couples and raises
questions in both equal protection jurisprudence and
Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence. This Note uses
these cases as a lens through which to explore full faith
and credit and equal protection doctrines as applied to
children born in one state but adopted by a same-sex
couple out of state. This Note argues the need for a childcentric solution to this circuit split. In particular, this
Note (1) introduces the circuit split; (2) explores the legal
realities of gay and lesbians and the failure of the equal
protection doctrine to prevent discrimination against
them — and more relevantly — their children; (3)
discusses the split under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution; and (4) raises policy concerns
regarding the nation’s public health and vital statistics
program that is put at risk by the Adar holding. This
Note concludes that children — indeed all children —
though perhaps particularly those children marginalized
by their same-sex parents’ marital status deserve to have
a document that proves their identity, their parentage,
their age, and their nationality.
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I.

Introduction: By Accident of Your Birth
— When your parents are gay or lesbian,
you have more rights if you were born
in Oklahoma than if you were born in
Louisiana.

Since many dysfunctional, abusive households have
a mother and a father present, it’s clear that being
heterosexual is not necessarily a qualification for being
a good parent.2
Betty DeGeneres
On August 3, 2007, the Tenth Circuit held
as unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause the Oklahoma adoption statute that refused
to recognize an adoption by a same-sex couple.3 The
court reasoned that not only did Oklahoma have to
recognize the adoption and give full faith and credit
to it, Oklahoma “already has the necessary mechanism
for enforcing judgments.”4 The same-sex parents
merely sought to have Oklahoma apply its own laws
to “enforce their adoption order in an even-handed
manner.”5 On April 12th, 2011, on similar facts, the
Fifth Circuit upheld Louisiana’s refusal to reissue a
birth certificate to a child who was born in Louisiana
but adopted by a gay male couple in New York. The
court determined neither the Full Faith & Credit
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution require Louisiana to do so.6 The
court further noted that Louisiana “recognized” the
New York adoption but reasoned the reissuance of a
birth certificate was an enforcement measure and held
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “does not oblige
Louisiana to confer particular benefits on unmarried
adoptive parents contrary to its law.”7
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The circuit split between the Tenth Circuit
and the Fifth Circuit gives rise to questions regarding
both Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit
jurisprudence. Among these questions are: how can
the children of same-sex couples be protected? Should
gays and lesbians have heightened scrutiny under
equal protection analysis? Should children of samesex couples receive heightened scrutiny under equal
protection? Does the Full Faith & Credit Clause
require interstate recognition of an adoption decree
and if so, when does that recognition require one
state to trounce on another state’s public policy?
Finally, does a child have a fundamental right to an
accurate birth certificate that reflects his or her legal
familial realities?
This Note takes up these questions and
argues the need for a child-centric solution to this
circuit split. Part II of this Note explores the legal
realities of gays and lesbians and the failure of the
equal protection doctrine to prevent discrimination
against them and their families. Part III explores the
possibility of the equal protection doctrine being
applied to the children of same-sex couples as a way
to secure benefits and protections that are currently
denied to the children. Part IV details the full faith and
credit issues and further explores the facts of Finstuen
and Adar. Part V raises policy concerns regarding
the nation’s public health and vital statistics program
should the holding in Adar be undisturbed. Part VI
concludes with the prediction — and the hope —
that the Finstuen holding will eventually prevail.
II. Equal Protection: Equal for Whom?
If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.8
Justice William J. Brennan Jr.
The legal status of same-sex couples,
and indeed the legal status of their families, is not
yet settled in law. The Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) ensures that no state shall “be required
to give effect to” same-sex marriages from any other
state and defines marriage for purposes of federal law
as a “legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife.”9 Currently there are six states and
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the District of Columbia where same-sex couples can
legally marry.10 There are sixteen states and the District
of Columbia where same-sex couples can petition to
adopt statewide.11 Utah, Louisiana, and Mississippi
have adoption laws that essentially prohibit samesex couples from adopting in their jurisdictions.12
Estimates vary on the number of children raised by
same-sex couples in the United States but the figures
often cited range from 1,000,000 to more than
9,000,000.13
Until recently, lawmakers had been able to
overtly discriminate against gays and lesbians as a
class.14 In 1952 the American Psychological Association
classified homosexuality as a mental illness.15 In the
same year Congress passed the McCarran-Walter
Immigration and Nationality Act,16 which excluded
from entry into the United States “psychopathic
personalities.”17 The Supreme Court not only upheld
the law in deportation proceedings against a gay
man in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization
Services,18 but noted that “[t]he legislative history
of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt
that Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic
personality’ to include homosexuals ….”19 In 1953,
President Eisenhower prohibited gays and lesbians
from federal employment.20 Perhaps the best example
of class-based discrimination against gays and lesbians
is evident in the history of statutes that criminalize
consensual same-sex sodomy.21
Though undoubtedly curbed somewhat
recently due to favorable holdings in Lawrence v.
Texas22 and Romer v. Evans,23 lawmakers can still
use their lawmaking power to discriminate against
gay and lesbian individuals and families.24 Despite
this history of discrimination, the Supreme Court
has not yet definitively weighed in on whether gays
and lesbians constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and are thus entitled to a higher level of judicial
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis.25 Still,
the Court has struck down discriminatory laws using
a seemingly more exacting form of rational basis.26 In
Lawrence, the Court struck down a sodomy statute
used to prosecute two men for engaging in consensual
sex in the privacy of their home.27 In Romer, the
Court used rational basis to strike down as a violation
of equal protection a Colorado state constitutional
amendment that repealed state and local laws barring
sexual-orientation discrimination.28

THE MODERN AMERICAN

The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution provides that states may not “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”29 The equal protection framework applies
when a law either draws a distinction among people
based on a particular characteristic or when the law
is facially neutral, but there is a discriminatory impact
or effect on a particular class.30 Most laws are subject
to rational review, the most deferential standard.31
Only when the court deems the classification
to categorize based on certain protected classes,
(considered “suspect”32 or “quasi-suspect”33 classes)
will the court look more closely at the law, its purpose,
and the “fit” between the law and its purpose.34 In
looking at the “fit,” a court will consider whether
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.35 Equal protection is often
discussed as a three-tiered approach and some scholars
have advocated for a complete overhaul of equal
protection doctrine.36
Lower courts have also been reluctant to
designate gays and lesbians as a suspect or quasisuspect class.37 Although recently some courts have
done just that.38 When a court designates a group
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, every law that
implicates a facial classification of that group by its
class is entitled to heightened scrutiny.39 Perhaps
this partly explains why the Supreme Court has
not — since 1977 — designated any new groups as
quasi-suspect or suspect classes, though the Court
has had the chance to review cases involving gays
and lesbians, the indigent, and the developmentally
disabled.40 This hesitance is not new; in 1927 the
Court referred to equal protection as “the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments ….”41
Some have made the argument that gays and
lesbians ought to receive heightened judicial scrutiny,
which would protect them and their families from
possible legislative biases.42 Currently, most courts
apply rational basis scrutiny, which requires only a
rational relationship between the law’s classification
and the law’s legitimate purpose.43 Rational basis
scrutiny offers little protection to gays and lesbians
as a class. Until the Supreme Court intervenes,
state legislatures will likely continue to discriminate
against gay and lesbian individuals and families,
though perhaps less openly. Perhaps because of
cases like Romer and Lawrence, there seems to be a
greater trend of policy makers couching their anti-
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gay biases in statutes that, on their face, do not target
gays and lesbians.44 Legislators can invoke DOMA,
which provides that no state will be required to
extend marriage rights to same-sex couples without
its consent. Policy makers in more conservative states
can now condition certain rights, such as adoption
rights, on the status of being married and assure
that same-sex couples will have a difficult time
making an effective equal protection claim because
the facial classification is “marriage” and not “sexual
orientation”.45
Essentially, unmarried heterosexual couples
and their families are shafted alongside same-sex
couples so that these statutes will not reveal a sheer
animus toward same-sex couples.46 The children of
same-sex couples suffer the most.47
Situated within this background of uncertain
legal rights for same-sex couples, are the children
of these couples. These children exist with all the
complexity and diversity of typical modern families
but there is an added layer of complexity by virtue of
the children’s parents being the same sex. This Note
focuses on adoptive children of same-sex couples.
These children have a legally established relationship
with both their parents regardless of whether one
parent also has biological ties to the child.
III. What about the Children?

One of the most fundamental social interests is that
law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be
nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor
or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.48
Benjamin N. Cardozo
“Since the first generation of lesbian mother
family law issues … advocates have been fighting to
keep the focus on the children.”49 The issue often gets
framed as one of discrimination or oppression, which
ultimately focuses on the individual same-sex couple
or on gay and lesbian people more generally.50 “The
framing of the issue as one of discrimination tends
to overlook the effects on children and reinforces
the tactics of the opponents of recognizing same-sex
families.” 51 Advocates should insist on keeping the
focus on children. One way to do this is to put in the
forefront the benefits and protections denied to the
children of same-sex couples because of their parents’
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inability to marry. The issue is not that the parents
are denied the benefits and protections of marriage,
but that their children are denied the benefits and
protections of their parents being married. When
referencing heterosexual family life, courts already
emphasize the importance of raising children as being
intermingled with the importance of marriage.52
One of the key contemporary
justifications for marital laws is that
marriage directly and indirectly
benefits the children reared by the
couple …. If the goal were truly
child welfare, the most direct way
of accomplishing the goal would
be permitting all couples that have
children to marry. Such a policy
would be easy to administer, and
would acknowledge that all children
are equally entitled to the rights
and benefits purportedly created
for child welfare …. [T]he reality
is that there is a large class of children that are not able to have their
development assisted by rights purportedly created for their benefit.53
The issue of same-sex marriage is beyond
the purview of this Note, but the focus should
remain the same — on the children. In the case at
hand, even if the state of Louisiana has a legitimate
state interest in denying adoption rights to samesex couples, what purpose can denying that child an
accurate birth certificate serve to the state? A birth
certificate is recognized as a fundamental document
that proves identity, parentage, age, and nationality.54
It is important for a range of activities, and can be
required for sports, for jobs, to get public assistance,
to get a passport required for travel, and most
importantly, would prove parentage in the case of
a medical emergency.55
The Supreme Court has applied intermediate
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for
classifications based on illegitimacy.56 “[I]mposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing.”57 The Court went on to state, “no
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as
38

an unjust — way of deterring the parent.”58 In
Plyler v. Doe,59 the Supreme Court recognized that
intermediate scrutiny for children does not apply
only to illegitimate children but anytime the state is
punishing a child for the parents’ misconduct.60 The
Plyler Court ruled that withholding state educational
funds from undocumented children and allowing
local school districts to deny enrollment to these
children is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.61
The Court extended the equal protection doctrine
beyond illegitimate children, holding anytime
there is “legislation directing the onus of a parent’s
misconduct against his children [it] does not comport
with fundamental notions of justice.”62 Further, the
Court decided the case on equal protection grounds,
noting “[t]he Equal Protection Clause was intended
to work nothing less than the abolition of all castebased and invidious class-based legislation.”63 Sex
classifications also receive intermediate scrutiny.
Applying intermediate scrutiny would offer
increased protections for same-sex couples and their
children because it requires the law that classifies
regarding sexual orientation to do so because of
an important government interest (a higher bar
than a legitimate government interest) and the fit
between the law and the interest must substantially
advance that interest (not just be rationally related
to it). Indeed, no longer will theoretical justifications
suffice, but the government interest must actually be
the purpose for which the law was passed.
These precedents should serve as guideposts when legislatures, courts, and executive officials
withhold benefits and protections to children of samesex couples on account of the marital status and/or
sexual orientation of their parents. It is surprising then
that the majority in Adar quickly dismissed the equal
protection argument, ignored Plyler, and limited
the Weber line of cases to biological illegitimacy.64
Consequently the Adar court applied rational basis
to the classification.65 The Adar court then compared
marriage outcomes with cohabitation outcomes
noting marriage “is associated with better outcomes
for children since marriage is more likely to provide
the stability necessary for the healthy development of
children.”66 The court reasoned that, “Louisiana may
rationally conclude that having parenthood focused
on a married couple or single individual — not the
freely severable relationship of unmarried partners —
furthers the interest of adopted children.”67
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Because the lower court in Adar granted
summary judgment to the parents on the full faith
and credit issue, it declined to reach the equal
protection issue.68 The Fifth Circuit, therefore,
dismissed the equal protection claim without it ever
being heard by the lower court. Typically, the only
time the Fifth Circuit addresses an issue that was not
first addressed by the district court is “when such issue
presents a pure question of law, the proper resolution
of which is beyond any doubt.”69 The district court
in Finstuen certainly did not find the issue to be one
such matter of law beyond any doubt.70 While the
Tenth Circuit decided Finstuen on the states’ full faith
and credit obligations, the district court in Finstuen v.
Edmondson71 held Oklahoma’s adoption amendments
constituted an equal protection violation.72 The
Adar court was not troubled by the equal protection
challenge and was not persuaded by the Weber line of
cases nor by Finstuen on this matter.
IV. The Circuit Split: Recognition
or Enforcement?

The real issue is not whether the court of either state
must conform its decision to that of the other, but
whether both must not conform their decisions in this
field to some federal constitutional standard.73
Justice Robert H. Jackson
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State.”74 The purpose of the clause “was
to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
of the others ….”75 The clause upholds the intent that
individual states be “integral parts of a single nation
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation
might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the
state of its origin.”76 The Clause “is not to be applied,
accordion-like, to accommodate our personal
predilections. It substituted a command for the earlier
principles of comity and thus basically altered the
status of the States as independent sovereigns.”77
Though the clause’s intent and purpose is
clear, its application has never been. Sixty-six years
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ago, former Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson
said this about the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
[I]t is doubtful if a century and a half
of constitutional interpretation has
advanced us much beyond where
we would be if there had never been
such a clause. Local policies and
balance of local interest still dominate the application of the federal
requirement. This is more strange
since the states have less to fear
from a strong federalist influence
in dealing with this than with most
other constitutional provisions.
The Federal Government stands
to gain little at the expense of the
states through any application of it.
Anything taken from a state by way
of freedom to deny faith and credit
to law of others is thereby added to
the state by way of a right to exact
faith and credit for its own.78
The Clause has now undergone more than
two centuries of “constitutional interpretation,” but
the recent Adar decision makes one wonder if the
jurisprudence “has advanced us much beyond where
we would be if there had never been such a clause.”
One aspect of the Clause remains clear; judicial
precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws from
that owed to judgments.79
Regarding statutes, a court may be guided by
a forum state’s public policy.80 Regarding judgments,
the full faith and credit obligation is exacting and
gives rise to no “roving public policy exception” to
the full faith and credit due.81 The Supreme Court
has held that credit must be given to the judgment
of another state although the forum would not be
required to entertain the suit itself.82 “Full faith and
credit, however, does not mean that States must
adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.”83
The power to determine the time, manner, and
mechanisms for enforcing judgments is reserved for
the forum state and does not travel with a sister state’s
judgment.84 “Orders commanding action or inaction
have been denied enforcement in a sister State ….”85
These enforcement measures “remain subject to the
even-handed control of forum law.”86
39

One such illustrative case is Rosin v. Monken.87
Rosin accepted a plea agreement for a misdemeanor
offense of non-consensual sexual contact in New York
that did not require him to register as a sex offender in
New York.88 While living in Illinois, the local police
department informed him that he was required to
register as a sex offender in Illinois.89 He brought suit
alleging Illinois failed to give full faith and credit due
to the judgment of the New York court. 90 He asserted
that Illinois could not force him to register as a sex
offender in its jurisdiction.91 The court disagreed,
noting the absence in the order of any provision
relieving him of an obligation to register in any state
other than New York.92 The court also reasoned that,
even if the order did contain such language, “[one
state] has no extra-territorial jurisdiction to exercise
police power in [another state].”93 Though a public
policy exception does not exist for judgments, another
exception does.94 One state cannot use the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to “interfere impermissibly with
the exclusive affairs of another.”95 New York simply
lacks the power to “dictate the means by which Illinois
can protect its public.”96
Justice Jackson was adamantly opposed to any
public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, believing such an exception would strip the
clause of all practical meaning.97 He advocated for a
broad reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
believing that the clause should “meet the needs of
an expanding national society for a modern system
of administering, inexpensively and expeditiously, a
more certain justice.”98 In dealing with full faith and
credit problems, Jackson asserts the “policy ultimately
to be served … is the federal policy of ‘a more perfect
union’ of our legal systems.”99
Whether the policy of ‘a more perfect union’ is
best served by a narrow or a more broad interpretation
of “recognition” and indeed “enforcement” is
dependent on one’s views of same-sex marriage, samesex adoption, and same-sex parenting generally. In
order to take up the intricacies of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its obligation to “recognize,” but
not necessarily “enforce” sister-state judgments, the
facts of Finstuen and Adar become illustrative.
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a. Finstuen v. Crutcher — A Story of State
“Recognition” of Judgments
Three same-sex couples and their adopted
children brought a challenge to Oklahoma’s adoption
law that refused to recognize out of state adoptions by
same-sex couples.100 The first couple, Greg Hample
and Ed Swaya, adopted a child, in 2002, in their
home state of Washington.101 The parents petitioned
the child’s birth state of Oklahoma for a valid birth
certificate, but the state refused to list both parents
on the form.102 The couple contested the action,
prompting the Oklahoma State Department of Health
(“OSDH”) to seek an opinion from the Oklahoma
Attorney General whether the state was required to
list both men on the birth certificate.103 The Attorney
General, citing the United State Constitution’s Full
Faith and Credit Clause, opined that Oklahoma was
required to issue the child an updated birth certificate
reflecting both of the child’s legal parents.104 The
OSDH issued the couple a birth certificate that listed
both men as parents.105 The state legislature responded
a month later by enacting what the Finstuen court
called the “adoption amendments,” which statutorily
gave Oklahoma the right to refuse to recognize a
same-sex adoption from any jurisdiction.106 The
Hample/Swaya family’s claim was dismissed for lack
of standing because they had received a valid revised
birth certificate, therefore, their injury — refraining
from visiting Oklahoma — was too speculative.107
Two other couples were involved in the
litigation. The second couple — Anne Magro and
Heather Finstuen — lived in Oklahoma but their
children were born and adopted in New Jersey.108 The
couple has valid revised birth certificates from New
Jersey.109 The Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed the
Finstuen/Magro family’s claim for lack of standing
because the children had valid New Jersey birth
certificates.110
The third couple — Lucy Doel and Jennifer
Doel — sought an Oklahoma birth certificate for their
child, who was born in Oklahoma but adopted in
California.111 OSDH issued a birth certificate naming
only Lucy Doel as her mother and denied the couple’s
request to have a revised birth certificate naming both
parents.112 Ultimately only the Doels satisfied the
standing requirement of “injury in fact.”113
In addition to showing that the OSDH
refused to revise the child’s birth certificate to reflect
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the child’s legal realities, the Doel couple encountered
a medical emergency and were told by an ambulance
crew and emergency room personnel that only “the
mother” could accompany the child in a medical
emergency.114
After a lengthy discussion of jurisdictional
issues,115 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision that the adoption amendment was
unconstitutional because “the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires Oklahoma to recognize adoptions
— including same-sex couples’ adoptions — that
are validly decreed in other states.”116 The Tenth
Circuit noted that an adoption, though sometimes
called a “decree” or “order” refers to a final adoption
decision, and is a “court’s final determination of the
rights and obligations of the parties in a case” and as
such is a final judgment of the court.117 The Tenth
Circuit then reiterated the precedential distinction
between statutes and judgments under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, noting that the clause “applies
unequivocally to … judgments of sister states.”118
In holding the Oklahoma adoption amendment
unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit quoted the
Supreme Court in Baker, “[r]egarding judgments …
the full faith and credit obligation is exacting” and
there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full
faith and credit due judgments.”119
The Finstuen court reasoned that OSDH’s
“argument improperly conflates Oklahoma’s
obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister
state’s judgment with its authority to apply its own
state laws in deciding what state-specific rights
and responsibilities flow from that judgment.”120
The court noted that if “Oklahoma had no statute
providing for the issuance of supplementary birth
certificates for adopted children, the Doels could not
invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause in asking
Oklahoma for a new birth certificate.”121 Enforcement
of the judgment is transferred to the laws of the forum
state (in this case Oklahoma), which means Oklahoma
law applies. Oklahoma law has a method to deal with
reissuance of birth certificates. “The State Registrar,
upon receipt of a certificate of a decree of adoption,
shall prepare a supplementary birth certificate in the
new name of the adopted person with the names of
the adopted parents listed as the parents.”122 Same-sex
couples and their children are entitled to evenhanded
enforcement of Oklahoma’s own laws.123
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b. Adar v. Smith — A Story of State
“Enforcement” of Judgments
The facts of Adar are quite similar to the
facts in Finstuen. In this case, Mickey Smith and
Oren Adar, a gay couple then living in New York
legally adopted a Louisiana-born infant (Infant J) in
2006.124 The couple petitioned the Louisiana state
Registrar to revise the child’s birth certificate to reflect
the adoption.125 The Fifth Circuit held that no such
suit could be filed in federal district court because the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is an obligation upon
state courts and does not create a basis for federal
court jurisdiction.126 Further, the Fifth Circuit held,
the only “remedy for a state’s refusal to discharge its
obligations under the [Full Faith and Credit Clause]
remains an appeal to the Supreme Court.”127 The
Fifth Circuit then advanced the opinion that even
if 42 U.S.C. Section 1983128 provides a remedy for
Full Faith and Credit Clause violations, the Louisiana
Registrar did not deny recognition of the New York
Adoption decree.129
Understanding the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit requires separating the concepts of
“recognition” and “enforcement.” Though the Fifth
Circuit admits that judgments give rise to “exacting”
credit obligations, the “enforcements of judgments is
subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.”130
The Fifth Circuit noted that evenhanded “means
only that the state executes a sister state judgment
in the same way that it would execute judgments in
the forum court.”131 Thus, the reasoning continues,
since Louisiana does not issue adoptions for same-sex
couples, then Louisiana does not have to issue revised
birth certificates for children born in Louisiana but
adopted out of state.
Louisiana and its Registrar have not
refused to recognize the validity of the New York
adoption decree, the adoption is arguably sufficiently
recognized for full faith and credit purposes, but
Louisiana insists nothing in the adoption order
entitles the child to an accurate birth certificate.132
“[T]he mechanics for enforcing a judgment do not
travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full
faith and credit.”133 According to the Fifth Circuit,
“Louisiana is competent to legislate in the area of
family relations, and the manner in which it enforces
out-of-state adoptions does not deny them full faith
and credit.”134
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c.

Searching for an “Exacting” Story of
“Evenhanded” “Enforcement” of Forum Law

The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Adar is
problematic both as a matter of public policy and as
a doctrinal application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. First, against precedent and policy,135the Adar
court cited Thompson v. Thompson136 as foreclosing
a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against executive
actors who violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.137
A Section 1983 action has the effect of voiding any
state statute that deprives an individual of any right
arising from the United States Constitution.138 In
Thompson, “the principal problem Congress sought
to remedy was the inapplicability of full faith and
credit requirements to custody determinations.” 139
The solution Congress adopted was the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act — a statutory “command
to state courts to give full faith and credit to the child
custody decrees of other states.”140 The legislative
history makes it clear that Congress did not intend
Federal Courts to play an enforcement role.141
The facts of Thompson simply cannot be
compared to the facts in Adar. Thompson is a suit
between an ex-husband and an ex-wife; it is naturally
limited “as a suit between two private parties.”142 Adar
is a “private party against a state actor.”143 As such,
the petitioners in Adar “have no need for an implied
cause of action: Section 1983 expressly provides them
with the only remedy they seek and the only one they
need.”144 In every case that the Fifth Circuit cites
to support the proposition that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause affords only a rule of decision in state
courts, the defendant was a private citizen, not a state
official.145 “This is the only reason why the default
federal remedies that are available in actions against
state officials, i.e., the doctrine of Ex Parte Young and
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, were not available against
the private actors in Thompson and its progeny.”146
The Fifth Circuit misapplied the law in
Adar in a second way as well. An adoption, as a final
judgment, is binding throughout the country.147
In fairness, occasionally interested parties, like
grandparents or foster parents are permitted to
challenge an adoption.148 Though, it does not make
sense to allow an uninterested party to challenge
such adoption.149 In Finstuen, the OSDH advanced
the argument that Oklahoma was not required to
recognize an out-of-state adoption decree because the
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Oklahoma Commissioner of Health was not a party
to the judgment.150 The court ultimately rejected
the argument because it “would vitiate the Full Faith
and Credit Clause by seemingly requiring each state
in the nation to be a party to the original action in
a sister state in order for the resulting judgment to
be enforced across the country.” 151
Even if Louisiana truly recognizes the outof-state adoption of Infant J and reissuing a birth
certificate is an enforcement measure, it must be
noted that the parents are trying to seek enforcement
of a Louisiana statute, not a New York statute. The
Fifth Circuit relies on the 1915 Supreme Court Case
of Hood v. McGehee152 to advance its enforcement
theory. In Hood, a man adopted children in
Louisiana, and then bought property in Alabama.153
At his death, the children brought an action to
quiet title to the land in Alabama. 154 Under Louisiana
law, the adopted children would have inheritance
rights to the property but under the Alabama
inheritance statute, children could not inherit land
by or through an adoptive parent.155 The Supreme
Court held that there is “no failure to give full
credit to the adoption of the Plaintiff, in a provision
denying them the right to inherit land in another
state. Alabama is sole mistress of the devolution
of Alabama land by descent.”156
The Hood case is not the best case to analogize
to Adar. The petitioners are not attempting to impose
New York’s adoption practices nor New York’s
vital statistics statute upon Louisiana. Petitioners
acknowledge that Louisiana law governs the issue,
not New York law.157 The reliance on Hood only
strengthens the argument that Louisiana must reissue
Infant J an accurate birth certificate.
The problem is not just that Louisiana
refuses to issue a valid birth certificate to Infant J, but
that Louisiana refuses to issue a valid birth certificate
to Infant J even though its own vital statistics law
requires it to do so.158 Louisiana’s own vital statistics
statute regarding adoption decrees provides, “[u]pon
receipt of the … decree, the state registrar shall make
a new record in its archives, showing: … [t]he names
of the adoptive parents and any other data about
them that is available and adds to the completeness
of the certificate of the adopted child.”159 There is no
forum state issue here. The couple is not trying to
get New York’s birth certificate statute to reach into
Louisiana. They are merely trying to get Louisiana to
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apply its own vital statistics statute without prejudice
toward them as the legal parents of their Louisianaborn child.
Louisiana’s vital statistics statute is separate
from Louisiana’s adoption statute. The vital statistics
statute directs the registrar on how to record a foreign
adoption for vital statistics purposes. Louisiana’s
adoption statute limits adoption to single individuals
and married couples and prevents same-sex couples
from adopting in Louisiana.160 Louisiana’s own vital
statistics law requires the Registrar to reissue an
accurate birth certificate for an adopted child who
was born in Louisiana.161 Pursuant to its adoption
statute, Louisiana does not issue adoption judgments
to same-sex couples, which Louisiana has not been
forced to do. Pursuant to its vital statistics statute,
Louisiana is required to re-issue birth certificates
to children born in Louisiana, but adopted outside
of the state.
In order to see the flaw in the holding in Adar,
consider Louisiana’s own statutes. It may be helpful to
consider Louisiana’s adoption statute as representing
its public policy. Because of Louisiana’s public policy
concerns, it does not allow for same-sex adoptions.
To continue this analogy, Louisiana’s vital statistics
statute then represents its records obligations. The
Registrar refused to issue a revised birth certificate for
Infant J even though Louisiana’s own vital statistics
law requires it. To support its lack of recognition/
discriminatory enforcement of New York’s judgment,
Louisiana cites its adoption law as authority for this
discriminatory act, a law that is wholly separate from
Louisiana’s vital statistics statute.162
Evenhanded enforcement of an out-of-state
adoption decree, under Louisiana’s own state law
requires the registrar to issue a new birth certificate that
includes the names of the adoptive parents. There is
nothing “evenhanded” about purporting to recognize an
out of state adoption yet, refusing to follow Louisiana’s
own law in reissuing a revised birth certificate. The
State Registrar’s refusal to provide an amended birth
certificate that accurately reflects the legal parent/child
relationship to some children adopted in states other
than Louisiana is not only a denial of recognition of
those out-of-state adoptions, but is also a denial of
evenhanded enforcement of Louisiana’s own forum
law, running afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution.
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If Louisiana’s adoption statute represents its
public policy and its vital statistics statute its records
obligations, then the holding in Adar appears to be
nothing more than Louisiana trying to assert a public
policy exception into the credit owed to judgments.
Why else would it apply its own vital statistics law
to some adoptions, issuing valid birth certificates to
those children, but refuse to do so for children of
same-sex couples?
Considering the denial of certiorari, these
misapplications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
appear not to concern the United States Supreme
Court. Perhaps the risk to the vital statistics program
of the nation is more concerning to the Court
or Congress.
V. Birth Certificates: What’s in a name? Or Two?

I found it almost impossible to imagine how one would
go through life without an identity.163
Anil Kapoor
The children in this case were not provided
accurate birth certificates, so they will become adults
without identification that adequately reflects who
they are.
Louisiana’s refusal to issue an accurate birth
certificate for these individuals undermines the
accuracy of Louisiana’s vital records and, in fact,
the entire United States vital statistics program.
This refusal means that an incorrect birth certificate
remains on file for many children. The child’s birth
certificate is inaccurate in that it lists the names of
the biological parents who are no longer the child’s
legal parents. Numerous complications arise because
birth certificates are widely recognized as providing
identity, nationality, and parentage.164
Birth certificates are widely used by coaches
of sports teams to determine age, by schools for
eligibility purposes, for employment purposes, and
are used to obtain other documents such as driver’s
licenses, social security cards, and passports.165 Birth
certificates are also widely used to determine public
assistance eligibility for state and federal benefits.166 In
a medical emergency, a birth certificate serves as proof
of legal parentage and thus may be needed by samesex couples in order to direct the medical services of
their child.167
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In 1989, the United Nations Convention on
Rights of the Child (“CRC”), acknowledged birth
registration as a fundamental human right.168 The
CRC is the most widely ratified human rights treaty.169
The United States and Somalia are currently the only
countries that have not adopted its provisions.170
Plan International, a child’s rights/anti-poverty
organization, has launched a global campaign to
achieve universal birth registration.171 Although Plan
International focuses on the problems experienced
by children whose birth has not been registered at
all, certainly some of these problems, and perhaps
others, arise when a child has a legally inaccurate
birth certificate. The CRC has identified the impact
of non-registration on children to include negative
consequences in education, health, employment,
problems with statelessness, and consequences in
conflicts, wars, and natural disasters.172
Such registration also offers protection
against exploitation, including trafficking, illegal
adoption, child labor, and early military service.173
Child trafficking was so pervasive following the Asian
tsunami of 2004, that in some instances, many adults
came forward to collect the same child. 174 “During
conflicts and wars, identity becomes important as
children and their families are often displaced.”175
The connection between accurate registration and
public health has historical roots. It was the fear of
cholera that drove the need for precise statistics, as
it was early sanitarians who pressed for effective and
comprehensive registration laws.176
Some in the United States see these problems
as primarily issues of developing countries, which for
the most part is true.177 It is arrogant, though, for
people in the United States to think that the problems
other countries face will never impact its boundaries.
Imagine a large-scale emergency such as Hurricane
Katrina, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a
tragic earthquake, or even a simple car accident. Now
imagine a child who is orphaned or separated from
his parents during such an event. Now imagine that a
same-sex couple has adopted this child but the child’s
birth certificate names only his biological parents who
have relinquished their legal rights to the child.
As a matter of public policy — and to
protect the accuracy and vitality of its vital statistics
— the United States Congress should insist that the
individual states record legally accurate information
on a child’s birth certificate. Vital statistics as a
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state function was nothing more than a historical
accident anyway.178 Because of the bicameral system
of representation, the United States Constitution
provided for the decennial census.179 Thus the census
has always been a national function.180 “The need
for vital statistics … was unrecognized when the
Constitution was framed, and the vital records and
statistics system developed originally not as a national
undertaking, but first as a local, then as a State
function.”181 “The vital statistics of the United States
are collected and published through a decentralized,
cooperative system. Responsibility for registration
of births … is vested in the individual States.”182
This is not the states’ prerogative; it is the states’
responsibility. In the United States,
[v]ital records are the primary source
of the most fundamental public
health information. Data on births,
access to prenatal care, maternal
risk factors, infant mortality, causes
of death, and life expectancy are
examples of the type of information
provided by vital statistics. Over the
past 100 years, the national vital statistics system has matured into a program that can provide complete and
continuous information on issues of
importance to the Nation’s health.183
The United States does recognize the
federal interest in the health, the education and the
welfare of its citizens in the maintenance of accurate
vital statistics data.184 Currently, the collaboration
between the National Center for Health Statistics
and individual states “set forth the principles and
procedures essential for complete and accurate
registration of vital events.”185 Accurate vital statistics
requires dealing with the various legal realities
including realities of legitimation cases, foundling
cases, and cases of adoption:
In all States, special consideration
is given to adoption …. The recent
tendency among the States has been
to make legislative provision for new
birth certificates in these instances.
The law specifies that the original
certificate in adoption cases shall
be sealed with the certified court
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order of adoption, while a new birth
certificate is prepared showing the
adopting persons as the parents.186
Though the legal responsibility for the
registration of vital records fall on the individual
States, The 1992 Model State Vital Statistics Act and
Regulations acknowledges the federal government
works in partnership with the states to “build a
uniform system that produces records to satisfy the
legal requirements of individuals and their families
and also to meet statistical and research needs at
the local, State, and national levels.”187 “No Federal
requirement exist[s] regarding the reporting and
collection of birth certificate information.”188 It is
time that Congress act under its Commerce authority
to standardize the state birth certificates, require legal
accuracy,189 and require uniformity in the states’ birth
certificate reporting. Alternately, Congress could alter
the United States’ vital statistics program to conform
to other countries’ systems that overwhelmingly
have national systems of registration.190 The federal
interest is simply too important to allow a state to
undermine the accuracy and legitimacy of the entire
vital records program. The impermissible holding of
Adar allows Louisiana to maintain legally inaccurate
birth registrations, thus allowing states to shirk their
responsibilities under this system. If Louisiana can do
this, what is stopping any other state from doing so?
VI. Conclusion: Suffer Little Children
But Jesus said, Suffer little children, and forbid them not,
to come unto me: for of such is the kingdom of heaven.191
Matthew 19:14
Children of same-sex couples, indeed all
children, deserve the benefits and protections assured
to them by the document that proves their identity,
their parentage, their age and their nationality. While
both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
provide a possible avenue to rectify the holding
in Adar, Congress, too, has the power to enact
legislation that put children first. Neither the courts
nor legislatures should be off the hook, until this
needed reform is accomplished.
Justice Jackson had another relevant
statement regarding states’ obligations to each other:

FALL 2012

[T]he [F]ull [F]aith and [C]redit [C]
lause is the foundation of any hope
we may have for a truly national
system of justice, based on the preservation but better integration of
the local jurisdictions we have. If I
have any message to the legal profession worthy of the occasion it is this:
that you must not suffer this lawyer’s
clause to become the orphan clause
of the Constitution.192
It seems fitting that Justice Jackson warns not
to let the Full Faith and Credit Clause become the
orphan clause of the constitution. Particularly fitting
after Adar because this narrow interpretation of the
clause, quite literally, creates orphans.
All hope is not lost. Although the Supreme
Court did not grant certiorari on this particular
appeal, there is still the possibility Adar will be
overruled by the United States Supreme Court who
may resolve this split and clarify the full faith and
credit obligations states owe each other. Congress may
enact legislation to resolve this split as well, perhaps
in this age of identity theft,193 federal legislation
might emphasize a requirement for accurate vital
statistics or, perhaps the Fifth Circuit will eventually
overrule its interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Lastly, there is the possibility that Adar will
strengthen future equal protection challenges in the
Fifth Circuit.
Adar’s holding rests on the rationale that
Louisiana may conclude that only married couples
or single individuals can adopt. Same-sex couples can
marry now in six states.194 When a same-sex married
couple adopts a Louisiana-born child, what then?
Louisiana will either recognize the adoption and
issue a revised birth certificate as its law requires,195
or more likely, the state would try to avoid its
obligations, perhaps summoning DOMA in order to
avoid recognition. Louisiana will not be able to rely
on its adoption statute because that classification is
based on marriage. Louisiana will then have to rely
on DOMA, the constitutionality of which is not
yet determined,196 in order to dismiss the parents’
marriage. Sheer animus is not a legitimate state
interest; however, Louisiana’s response to this fact
pattern just might start to reek of it.
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Judge Haynes’ powerful dissent in Adar
might persuade other circuits when faced with
this or similar issues. One way or another, there is
the hope that it is only a matter of time until the
majority holding in Adar is corrected. For, as Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., noted “[t]he moral arc of
the universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”197
The arc, unfortunately, does not bend on its own;
child advocates, scholars, advocacy organizations,
and lawmakers must refuse to let Adar permanently
jeopardize children’s rights and exert pressure, until
the arc leans back towards justice.
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